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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 There has been much debate and discussion about the insurance 
“tripartite” relationship during the past few years,1 as well as a lot of 
misunderstanding about the role of attorney ethics within that 
relationship. The authors would like to let the readers in on a secret: 
other than the fancy term used to describe it, the tripartite 
relationship is really no different from any other multiple-client 
representation in which the clients agree to allocate among 
themselves the responsibilities of managing the litigation and 
decisionmaking.2 
 When a claim is made against an insured person under a typical 
liability policy, a tripartite relationship is established between an 
insurance company, its insured, and the defense attorney hired to 
represent their joint interests in resolving the claim. The 
relationship is one that has existed and worked well for decades. It 
involves corresponding rights and obligations between the insurer 
and insured outlined in the insurance policy and obligations 
undertaken by the insurer and common counsel in the retention 
arrangement, as well as duties owed by the common counsel to both 
clients under the attorney ethics rules. The nature of the relationship 
is one of substantive contract law, with relevant concepts often 
embedded in statutes, regulations, and case law. 
                                                                                                                      
 1. See, e.g., INSURANCE PRACTICES SPECIAL STUDY COMM., THE FLA. BAR, REPORT OF 
THE INSURANCE PRACTICES SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE 3 (June 2, 2000), www.flabar.org/ 
newflabar/images/downloads/rpts4fin.pdf [hereinafter IPSSC REPORT]. 
 2. This Article assumes the formation of an attorney-client relationship between an 
insurer and defense attorney when the defense attorney is hired by the insurer to defend a 
covered claim against an insured. Such a relationship normally exists. See infra Appendix 
A. While the authors would reach the same conclusions where the insurer is not a co-client 
with its insured (i.e., where the insurer is the insured’s agent), the analysis differs under 
the ethics rules and this Article does not attempt to undertake that analysis. 
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 Recently, numerous state bar ethics advisory opinions and at least 
one reported court decision have employed rather tortured analyses 
to disrupt the well-functioning tripartite relationship, using “ethics” 
concerns to indirectly place restraints on the role of insurers in the 
tripartite relationship. These restraints include prohibitions against 
two well-established litigation management practices: submission of 
legal billing statements to auditing firms engaged by the insurer and 
use of certain insurer litigation guidelines (such as a requirement 
that counsel seek insurer approval before performing certain legal 
tasks).  
 The state bar opinions, promulgated under the asserted umbrella 
of attorney ethics, are flawed in a number of respects. First, the 
opinions confuse contractual and ethical issues. Interfering with the 
business relationships between attorneys and insurers, they serve 
only to protect the economic interests of attorneys rather than 
advance the interests of the insured-clients. Second, they ignore the 
fundamental distinction between an attorney’s ability to exercise 
independent professional judgment and a client’s right to decide 
whether an attorney’s recommended course of action should be 
implemented and legal fees for that action incurred.  
 Such prohibitions are not only ill supported, they are ill advised. 
These practices—used by many noninsurer-clients as well—were 
designed to institute a measure of efficiency and consistency among 
retained defense firms, at the same time lowering the cost of 
skyrocketing legal fees and curbing attorney billing abuses. 
Eliminating these important safeguards threatens to artificially 
standardize the cost of legal defense and correspondingly increase 
liability insurance premiums for consumers. 
 Yet this is but one of several unintended consequences such 
opinions may have for liability insurance in this nation. Others 
include undermining an insured’s tort remedy of “bad faith” against 
an insurer that manages the defense improperly; altering the terms 
of state-approved insurance contracts; creating confusion in the 
practical application of the defense clause in an insurance contract; 
placing insureds in the untenable position of having to give specific, 
informed consent as to issues about which they have little or no 
knowledge—issues they believe they have agreed for the insurer to 
handle; and even causing insureds to possibly forfeit the right to a 
defense or to coverage. These are serious consequences, but they are 
logical outgrowths of bar opinions that take such a myopic view of 
attorney ethics. 
 In Florida, however, the issues may be starting to come into focus. 
In 1999, The Florida Bar took an alternative approach to these issues 
by appointing a special committee, the Insurance Practices Special 
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Study Committee (IPSSC), to study those issues.3 After intensely 
studying the litigation management practices of insurance companies 
for over a year, the IPSSC concluded that there was “little harm” to 
insureds from the use of these practices.4 Indeed, the record before 
the IPSSC reflects absolutely no evidence whatsoever of any harm to 
any insureds as a result of these practices.5 The IPSSC recognized, 
however, that as with any representation of a client where another 
person or client is paying for the representation, the representation of 
an insured client at the request of the insurer creates a particular 
need for the attorney to be cognizant of the potential for ethical 
risks.6   
 To facilitate the attorney’s performance of ethical responsibilities 
in this regard and to assist Florida insurance consumers in 
understanding their basic rights as clients, the IPSSC developed and 
recommended the adoption of a disclosure statement, entitled 
Statement of Insured Client’s Rights (“the Statement”).7 Rather than 
restricting insurer litigation management practices and endangering 
the tripartite relationship, the Statement would provide guidance to 
defense attorneys and disclose information about the representation 
to insureds.8 In addition, comments to the Statement provide the 
basis for the adoption of similar statements for use in other recurring 
multiple-client contexts.9  
 On June 2, 2000, The Florida Bar accepted the recommendation of 
the IPSSC, voting to recommend amendment of Rule 4-1.8 of the 
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar to require use of the statement.10 
The proposed amendment is scheduled to come before the Florida 
Supreme Court later this summer. If adopted by the Florida 
Supreme Court as a new rule, this unique approach will be the first 
                                                                                                                      
 3. See Gary Blankenship, Insurance Practices Study Launched, FLA. BAR NEWS 
(Aug. 1, 1999), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/publicmediainfo/TFBNews/aug1-2.html 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2000). 
 4. IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. 
 5. The IPSSC report states that it found “little harm” to insureds from insurer 
litigation management practices. The record before the IPSSC, however, reflects not one 
instance of any harm whatsoever to any insured. See Record of IPSSC (available at The 
Fla. Bar).  
 6. See id. at 20-21. 
 7. See id. at 17-22. 
 8. See id. at 20-21. Insurance industry associations originally opposed the Statement 
as being discriminatory against insurers. However, because the Bar was willing to accept 
input from the insurance industry in developing a statement that was workable, and 
because the Statement did not contradict established law or policy and did not otherwise 
jeopardize the ability of insurers to freely offer insurance products to Florida consumers, 
the industry associations working with the Bar agreed not to contest implementation of the 
Statement.  
 9. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. 
 10. See Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar 
(June 2, 2000), www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/Board/jun00min.html. 
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of its kind and a level-headed response to the hysteria that has 
preceded issuance of some state bar ethics opinions. 
 Using Florida law as a model, Part II of this Article outlines the 
rights and duties that constitute the tripartite relationship, as 
established by relevant case law and ethics rules, and defines the 
proper role of the ethics rules in the context of that relationship. Part 
III describes current litigation management practices of insurers and 
others, with particular attention to the guidelines and auditing 
procedures which have been the subject of the recent controversy. 
Part IV then turns to the recent ethics opinions addressing these 
practices, analyzing them in light of the principles outlined in Part II 
and concluding that they reflect an inherently flawed approach. Part 
V then outlines the investigation and sound reasoning behind the 
Statement of Insured Client’s Rights. Finally, Part VI concludes that 
with no evidence of actual ethical violations or harm to insureds, 
there is no reason to inject these types of economic and contractual 
issues into the arena of ethics regulation. It applauds the policy of 
full disclosure embodied in the Statement and urges the Florida 
Supreme Court to adopt it. 
II.   THE TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP 
 To properly evaluate the ethical and economic debate that has 
marked this setting, it is important to first understand the 
relationships at issue and the proper role each party plays. Any 
approach to the current issues which ignores these now well-
established roles would create unnecessary and inappropriate 
tension with settled law, with far-reaching consequences. Conversely, 
examining this “tripartite” relationship will reveal several principles 
which can guide an analysis of the issues. 
A.   The Contractual Relationships 
 The aptly named insurance “tripartite” relationship involves, not 
surprisingly, three parties: (1) the insurance company that issues the 
liability insurance policy; (2) the insured against whom a claim is 
filed that is covered under the insurance policy; and (3) the attorney 
hired by the insurance company to defend the claim and represent 
the aligned interest of the insurer and insured. An important point, 
all too frequently ignored, is that these relationships are creatures of 
contract. The relationship between an insurer and a defense attorney 
arises from two separate, yet interrelated, contractual relationships. 
The first contract is the insurance policy between the insurer and the 
insured. The second contract is the retainer agreement between the 
insurer and the defense attorney. 
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1.   The Insurance Contract 
 Through the insurance policy between insurer and insured, the 
insured purchases more than reimbursement for damages. The policy 
also requires the insurer to provide a defense against any covered 
claim filed against the insured.11 Under most policies, the insurer 
must provide a defense even where the allegations against the 
insured are false, fraudulent, or groundless.12 In exchange for the 
duty to provide a good faith defense for the insured, most liability 
policy defense clauses give the insurer the right to control the 
litigation.13 That is, in exchange for the insurer’s broad defense 
obligations, the insured agrees to cede control of the defense to the 
insurer and agrees to cooperate in that defense.14 
 Florida, like most states, has repeatedly reaffirmed these 
contractual underpinnings. For instance, in discussing the insurer’s 
responsibilities under the insurance contract, the Florida Supreme 
Court stated as early as 1969 that “for a consideration it is 
contemplated that a business entity contracts to provide certain 
protection, including legal services, to its customers.”15 In that same 
opinion, the court emphasized that it is “the insurance contract 
which delineates the rights and duties of insurer and insured 
between themselves.”16 
 More recently, the court expounded on those rights and duties: 
In fulfilling its promissory obligation to defend, the insurer 
employs counsel for the insured, performs the pretrial 
investigation, and controls the insured’s defense after a suit is filed 
on a claim. The insurer also makes decisions as to when and when 
not to offer or accept settlement of the claim.17 
Thus, under the typical policy, an insured surrenders control over the 
handling of the claim, including all decisions with regard to litigation 
and settlement.18 In return, the insurer undertakes the quasi-
fiduciary obligation to conduct the litigation in good faith and with 
due regard for the interests of the insured.19 
                                                                                                                      
 11. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373 (Fla. 1995). 
 12. See Schuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 
So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Kent D. Syverud, The Ethics of Litigation Management Guidelines and Legal 
Audits, 21 Ins. Litig. Rep. (CBC) 180, 187 (May 1, 1999). 
 15. In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of Att’ys 
in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373-74 (Fla. 1995). 
 18. See Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980); 
Hollar v. International Bankers Ins. Co., 572 So. 2d 937, 938-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
 19. See Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d at 785; Hollar, 572 So. 2d at 938-39. 
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 Importantly, the insurer’s contractual defense obligation is not 
merely a requirement to fund the defense. Insurers are required to 
protect their policyholders’ interests to the same degree that they 
protect their own interests and to make independent decisions about 
the goals of the litigation and the means to fulfill those goals.20 In a 
litigation context, this is a major element of the duty of good faith 
owed by every insurer to its insureds. 
 Insurers cannot delegate this obligation to counsel, nor can they 
escape responsibility for an adverse result by looking to the defense 
attorney.21 Should the insurer ignore these obligations, the insured 
can sue for breach of contract and associated damages.22 Accordingly, 
under the contractual relationship between the insurer and the 
insured, the insurer protects its interests and the interests of its 
insured by assuming control of the defense and related costs.23 As a 
result, the insurer ordinarily must protect its insured in order to 
protect itself. Thus, the insurer and insured have a common interest 
in securing quality representation in order to keep the settlement or 
verdict as low as possible. 
2.   The Retainer Agreement: The Contractual Relationship 
Between the Insurer-Client and the Defense Attorney 
 Of course, the defense attorney hired by the insurer is not a party 
to the insurance contract. The formation of the attorney-client 
relationship and related contractual rights and obligations between 
the attorney and the insurer arise from the agreement under which 
an insurer retains the attorney. In the insurance defense context, 
this agreement defines the terms and conditions under which the 
attorney will provide representation with respect to a covered 
claim.24  
 Those terms and conditions commonly include certain litigation 
guidelines (including legal audit procedures), which are appended to, 
and form an integral part of, that contract. These guidelines assist 
                                                                                                                      
 20. See Schuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 
So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992).   
 21. See Doe, 653 So. 2d at 374. 
 22. See Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 1998); North Am. Van Lines, 
Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325, 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also FLA. STAT. § 
624.155(1)(b)(1) (2000) (stating that the insured can sue the insurer if the insurer does not 
attempt to settle in good faith when the insurer could or should have done so). 
 23. See Doe, 653 So. 2d at 373-74. 
 24. See Richard E. Mulroy, Issues of Outside Counsel Management, ACCA DOCKET, 
May/June 1995, at 28, 29 (“Formal written retention documents are widely used. These 
include written engagement letters, billing policy statements, or a combination of both at 
the onset of any engagement. The intent of these documents is to describe the nature and 
scope of the engagement for the benefit of all parties.”). 
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the insurer in fulfilling its contractual obligations to the insured,25 
namely, controlling the litigation and ensuring quality 
representation. Even in the atypical situation where the insured 
faces exposure in excess of policy limits, the insurer has both the 
incentive and the obligation to provide the insured with a proper 
defense.26 Such guidelines are thus an important facet of both 
contractual relationships. 
 A significant feature of the retainer agreement in this context is 
the dual nature of the representation the defense counsel 
undertakes. In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, the 
attorney, either explicitly or implicitly, represents the common, 
aligned interests of both the insurer and the insured.27 As the Florida 
Supreme Court has confirmed, “‘the legal responsibility placed on the 
insurance company give[s] pointed verification to the fact that the 
interest involved in defense of liability suits is primarily and 
ultimately the interest of the insurance company.’”28 Thus, the 
defense counsel may appropriately represent the interests of both the 
insurer and the insured so long as those interests are not in actual 
conflict.29 This is true regardless of whether the attorney is employed 
staff counsel or retained outside counsel.30 
 In part, this now long-settled principle is premised on the fact 
that the vast majority of insured lawsuits involve claims fully 
covered by the policy and, therefore, the possibility of actual conflict 
is minimal.31 Indeed, defense by an attorney representing both the 
insured and the insurer necessarily involves a case in which no 
collision of interests has occurred between the insurer and the 
insured that would create a material, irreconcilable conflict for the 
defense attorney in the representation.32 Thus, unless and until an 
actual conflict of interest occurs, the insurance company’s status as a 
client of defense counsel is secured as a matter of contract. 
                                                                                                                      
 25. See, e.g., Shuster, 591 So. 2d at 176-77 (finding that the insurer has exclusive 
authority to control settlement and be guided by its own self-interest where the language 
of the policy puts the insured on notice of the insurer’s right to do so). Under the most 
common policies, the insured being defended under an existing policy is indifferent to the 
costs of defense because the insurer must pay those without affecting the limits applicable 
to indemnification against judgments or settlements. However, some policies subtract 
defense costs from the limits or require the insured to contribute to those costs. 
 26. See Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the 
Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1595-96 (1994). 
 27. See infra Appendix A. 
 28. In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of Att’ys 
in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969). 
 29. See id. at 8 (citing a brief filed by Liberty Mutual Insurance). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id.  
 32. See id. 
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B.   Ethical Obligations in the Contractual Relationship 
 The contractual relationships outlined above are fully consistent 
with the rules governing the professional conduct of attorneys.33 In 
particular, application of Florida’s ethics rules, found in the Rules 
Regulating The Florida Bar,34 to the tripartite relationship 
demonstrates that neither the policy obligations of the insurer and 
insured nor the standard retainer agreement violate the attorney’s 
duties to maintain confidentiality and remain free of conflicting 
interests.  
1.   Confidentiality 
 Under the ethics rules, information may be shared between co-
clients and their representatives by the attorney hired to represent 
them. Under Rule 4-1.6 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, the 
attorney must maintain the confidences of the attorney-client 
relationship.35 This is true in any attorney-client relationship.36 
However, subsection (c) allows disclosure “to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary . . . to serve the client’s interest unless 
it is information the client specifically requires not to be disclosed.”37 
Thus, Rule 4-1.6 expressly permits disclosures “impliedly authorized” 
by the client.38 A “lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures 
about a client when appropriate in carrying out the representation, 
except to the extent that the client’s instructions or special 
circumstances limit that authority.”39 The reporter for the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (from which chapter 4 of the Rules 
Regulating The Florida Bar was derived) has explained that “[t]his 
standard is taken from the law of agency, under which implied 
authority is inferred from the nature of the representation, the 
‘general usages’ of similar relationships, and those acts which 
‘usually accompany’ or are ‘reasonably necessary’ to the represen-
                                                                                                                      
 33. Even in those few states where the insurer is not recognized as a co-client, the 
insurer’s role in the ethics constellation is resolved by noting that the insured, by entering 
into an insurance contract, “waives” certain ethical rights the insured might normally 
have. See, e.g., Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 1991). In Bell, Chief 
Justice Cavanagh’s dissent—which disagreed with the majority only on its equitable 
subrogation ruling—reaffirms the coexistence of an attorney’s contractual and ethical 
obligations to both the policyholder and the insurer, as well as the policyholder’s consent to 
forego certain ethical rights during the representation. See id. at 299-304 (Bell, J., 
dissenting). 
 34. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR ch. 4, http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/rrtfbch4. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001). 
 35. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6. 
 36. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt. 
 37. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6(c). 
 38. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt. 
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 7 (1998). 
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tation.”40 Absent some concrete and substantial risk of harm to the 
insured, all that is required is utility or convenience in carrying out 
the representation.41 Nor is there risk to the attorney-client privilege: 
because the insurer and the insured are co-clients of defense counsel, 
under the “common interest” doctrine, shared information is 
protected.42  
 When read together with the insured’s contractual obligation of 
cooperation with the insurer, this suggests that only if the attorney 
learns of information detrimental to the insured, or if the insured 
specifically asks that certain information be kept confidential from 
the insurer, must the attorney decline to share that information with 
the insurer. Otherwise, the information should be provided to the 
insurer to allow the insurer to properly manage the defense, 
including paying the attorney for appropriate legal services.  
2.   Duty of Loyalty 
 Under Rule 4-1.7, the attorney may represent multiple clients so 
long as their interests are aligned.43 Obviously, when an actual 
conflict arises in the joint representation of the insurer and the 
insured, the attorney must refrain from representing the interests of 
one of the parties.44 However, this is true in any attorney-client 
relationship where the attorney represents two or more clients in the 
same representation.45  
 In discussing the joint representation of the insurer and the 
insured, the Florida Supreme Court has noted that “[i]f the 
representation initially contemplates professional services to two 
clients with a mutuality of interests, the attorney carries the burden 
of clearly and distinctly disassociating himself from his allegiance to 
                                                                                                                      
 40. Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. at 27, In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct and Insurer 
Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000) (No. 98-612) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 33-35 (1958)), State Law Library of Mont., 
http://www.lawlibrary.state.mt.us/dscgi/ds.py/view/Collection-1831. 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. g 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 398 (1995) (stating that a lawyer may disclose billing information to an outside 
service bureau to prepare bills). 
 42. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502(4)(e) (2000) (“(4) There is no lawyer-client privilege under 
this section when: . . . (e) A communication is relevant to a matter of common interest 
between two or more clients, or their successors in interest, if the communication was 
made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common when offered in a civil 
action between the clients or their successors in interest.”) (indicating that the common 
interest doctrine protects shared client confidences unless and until a civil action arises 
between the co-clients to which the confidences are relevant); see also Visual Scene, Inc. v. 
Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). 
 43. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7, http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/ 
rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001). 
 44. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7 cmt. 
 45. See id. 
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one whenever the interests of the two cease to be mutual and come 
into collision.”46 This is the same obligation imposed on any lawyer 
who represents multiple clients, and it is triggered only when “a 
conflict of interests between clients appears.”47 Thus, under the 
ethics rules, a defense attorney is to represent the interests of both 
the insurer and the insured just as the attorney would do in any 
other multiple-client representation. 
 The tripartite relationship is also fully consistent with Rule 4-
1.8(f),48 which governs when an attorney can accept compensation for 
representing a client from a third party, and which mirrors the third-
party compensation rules of many other states.49 That rule provides 
that such an arrangement cannot compromise the attorney’s duty of 
loyalty to the client.50 First, as noted, the insurer is not simply a 
third party paying the compensation for the representation under 
Rule 4-1.8; rather, the insurer is a client of defense counsel so long as 
the interests of the insurer and the insured are aligned and there is 
no actual conflict at issue in the representation.51 As noted in the 
comments to Rule 4-1.7, which actually contemplate this joint 
representation: 
 A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the 
client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement 
does not compromise the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client. See 
rule 4-1.8(f). For example, when an insurer and its insured have 
                                                                                                                      
 46. In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of Att’ys 
in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1969). 
 47. Id. at 7. 
 48. Rule 4-1.8(f) provides as follows: 
Compensation by Third Party. A lawyer shall not accept compensation for 
representing a client from one other than the client unless: 
(1) the client consents after consultation; 
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and 
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by 
rule 4-1.6. 
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.8(f), http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2001). 
 49. Rule 4-1.8(f) is drawn from Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(f) without 
change. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Ironically, even some defense attorneys mistakenly believe they represent only 
the insured. However, as pointed out by a recent Maryland ethics opinion, this assumption 
conflicts with substantive law and could jeopardize some of the insured’s rights, especially 
in the area of attorney-client privilege, when necessary information must be disclosed to 
the insurer. See Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 00-23 (2000), LEXIS, 
Ethics Library, ETHOP File. Moreover, many defense firms actually list insurers as 
“representative clients” on their brochures, websites, and Martindale-Hubbell listings. See, 
e.g., Butler Burnette Pappas—Representative Client List, at 
http://www.bbplaw.com/clients.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001); Search of Martindale-
Hubbell Lawyer Locator, at http://lawyers.martindale.com/Executable/Firm.php3 (Katz, 
Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Bryant & Yon, P.A. listing) (last visited Jan. 31, 2001). 
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conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance 
agreement and the insurer is required to provide special counsel 
for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special 
counsel’s professional independence. So also, when a corporation 
and its directors or employees are involved in a controversy in 
which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide 
funds for separate legal representation of the directors or 
employees, if the clients consent after consultation and the 
arrangement ensures the lawyer’s professional independence.52 
As anticipated by this comment, until such time as the insurer and 
its insured have conflicting interests, the insurer is a co-client. 
However, once an actual conflict arises, the insurer may be required 
to provide special counsel and be considered a third-party payor of 
legal services.53  
 Also, as with all multiple-client representations, defense counsel 
owes a duty of loyalty to both the insurer and the insured. Under the 
ordinary insurance contract, the insurer has the responsibility to 
protect the interests of the insured, but the insured has agreed to 
allow the insurer, as a mutual co-client of the defense attorney and 
as agent for the insured, to control the costs and management of the 
litigation.54 The insurer has a right to control the litigation where the 
policy so specifies.55 The fact that the insurer is paying the fees and 
controlling the cost of litigation does not, in and of itself, in any way 
compromise defense counsel’s loyalty to the insured-client. Thus, as 
in any co-client representation where one client is authorized to 
control the litigation, no ethical dilemma exists for the defense 
counsel in adhering to an insurer’s decision regarding the defense 
unless such decision actually impairs defense counsel’s duty of 
loyalty to the insured. The defense attorney is faced with an ethical 
decision only when the interests of the attorney’s two clients, the 
insured and insurer, actually come into conflict.56 
 In short, the insurance contract ordinarily permits joint 
representation of the insurer and insured as well as exercise of 
                                                                                                                      
 52. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7 cmt. (emphasis added), http://www.flabar.org/ 
lawpractice/rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 373-74 (Fla. 1995). 
 55. See Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 
So. 2d 174, 176-77 (Fla. 1992). 
 56. See In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules Governing the Conduct of 
Att’ys in Fla., 220 So. 2d 6, 7 (Fla. 1969). The Court stated:  
 The rule, as suggested, seems to emphasize the employer-employee 
relationship as the element which would distinguish the lawyer’s responsibility 
to one of two clients . . . . 
 . . . The point we make merely is that when a conflict does arise the ethical 
decision which the lawyer faces is the same in both relationships—if he is 
employed to represent two clients. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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control by the insurer. Additionally, the retainer agreement between 
the defense attorney and the insurer is consistent with, and is a 
means of, complying with the conditions of the insurance contract. 
Only if some concrete situation discloses a substantial risk of harm to 
the insured arising from the insurer’s decisions is there an ethical 
problem for the attorney. 
III.   LITIGATION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES57 
A.   The Benefits of Litigation Management Practices 
 Litigation management has become increasingly important in 
recent years to all businesses, including insurers. Over the last thirty 
years, American businesses and insurers have experienced an 
unprecedented increase in litigation. The main reasons behind this 
steady, at times explosive, growth have been the expansion of causes 
of action and the liberalization of tort rights. 
 A sampling of the more significant legal developments include 
adoption of strict liability for products;58 comparative negligence in 
place of contributory negligence;59 environmental exposures;60 
employment practice liabilities;61 expanded duties of directors and 
officers to stockholders and customers;62 and availability of class 
actions.63 Clearly, these expanded exposures have vastly increased 
                                                                                                                      
 57. Part III has been adapted in significant part from the amicus brief filed by the 
American Insurance Association (AIA) before the Montana Supreme Court in In Re Rules 
of Professional Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806 
(Mont. 2000). That brief was submitted to the Court by Jacqueline T. Lenmark but was 
authored primarily by instant author J. Stephen Zielezienski. Specifically, all portions of 
that brief included herein were authored by Mr. Zielezienski. In its decision in the In Re 
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Montana Supreme Court did not address the benefits of 
litigation management practices. Further, as discussed infra at Part IV.B, the Montana 
Supreme Court rejected AIA’s arguments based on its corresponding rejection of the dual-
client status of the insurer and the insured in the tripartite relationship, which places 
Montana in the very small minority of states rejecting the dual-client status of the insurer 
and the insured. 
 58. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
 59. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). 
 60. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9626, 9651-9661, 9671-9675 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1993). 
 61. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 
(requiring employers to provide unpaid medical or pregnancy leave) (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105, 6301, 6381-6387 & 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)); 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 703(a), 704(a), 708 Stat. 253, 255, 
257 (prohibiting sexual discrimination and retaliation, among other things) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -3(a) (1994)). 
 62. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-74 (Del. 1985). 
 63. A survey conducted by the Federalist Society indicates that between 1988 and 
1998 the number of class actions pending in state courts increased by 1315%, while the 
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the cost to American business and insurers of defending themselves 
and their insureds. A comprehensive study of the U.S. tort system 
from 1930 to 1994 concluded: 
tort costs have grown almost four times faster than the U.S. 
economy over the past 64 years . . . . 
 . . . . 
The U.S. tort system is by far the most expensive in the 
industrialized world . . . . [The cost of the U.S. tort system is] 
substantially higher than that of any other country studied and 
two and a half times the average.64 
 These data demonstrate that litigation has ceased to be a matter 
of only occasional concern; it has become a major expense item in 
annual budgets, necessitating comprehensive management controls. 
Litigation management, by necessity, has become a full-time 
enterprise within the enterprise, commonly requiring oversight of 
millions, occasionally billions, of expense dollars as well as the 
companion (and much greater) costs of settlements, verdicts, and 
corporate reputation. As a part of litigation management, insurers 
implement a number of tools, such as requiring outside counsel to 
follow litigation management guidelines and hiring in-house or 
retained auditors to review legal bills. In other instances, insurers 
simply use in-house attorneys to handle the defense of covered 
claims. 
1.   Litigation Management Guidelines 
 As noted earlier, litigation management guidelines are 
frequently incorporated into the retention contract between the 
insurer and the defense attorney. At the outset of the 
representation, the attorney is typically provided with a copy of any 
applicable guidelines and, in agreeing to undertake the 
representation, the attorney agrees to abide by the cost controls set 
forth in those guidelines. In all critical respects, insurer guidelines 
bear a substantial resemblance to the guidelines used by other 
entities. In fact, a number of issues typically discussed in litigation 
guidelines have been specifically addressed and approved by case 
law. For example, courts have uniformly denounced bills that 
include incomplete or vague entries and have held it improper to 
                                                                                                                      
number in all federal courts increased by 340%. See Analysis: Class Action Litigation—A 
Federalist Society Survey, Part II, CLASS ACTION WATCH, Spring 1999, at 1, 6, Federalist 
Society, http://www.fed-soc.org/classaction1-2.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2000). Preliminary 
findings for a second group of respondents indicated similar results: a 550% increase in the 
number of pending state court class actions from 1988 to 1998. See id. 
 64. ROBERT W. STURGIS, TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, TORT COST TRENDS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1995). 
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charge multiple parties for work that has only been done once.65 
Among other things, typical guidelines detail the entity’s right to be 
consulted,66 what activities need prior approval,67 and how 
attorneys will be compensated.68 
 Most importantly, all guidelines set forth the organization’s right 
to control the decisions regarding the representation. For example, 
CIBA-GEIGY Corporation’s litigation guidelines state, “The 
Company is self-insured and exercises direct control of the liability 
cases against it. Accordingly, we have an understanding with outside 
counsel that retention of a firm is subject to our direct supervision 
and control.”69 The guidelines stress, “All important decisions with 
respect to the litigation are under our control.”70 Other corporate 
litigation guidelines convey similar expectations.71 
 Exercise of this kind of meaningful control can be critical to an 
entity confronted by litigation. For example, an entity may wish to 
determine the way its positions in litigation or otherwise are 
                                                                                                                      
 65. See H.J., Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming fee 
reduction based on district court finding that numerous entries were inadequate and 
vague); Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 406 F. 
Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
 66. See CIBA-GEIGY Corp., Litigation Procedures for Outside Counsel (July 1986) 
(Guideline 3.1), in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 705 (1987) (“During the 
first three months (90 days) following the assignment of a new case, your firm should 
prepare, in consultation with us, an overall plan and budget for this litigation . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); McDonnell Douglas Corp., Policies for Firms Providing Legal Services 
to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 735 
(Apr. 1998) (“Outside counsel is required to communicate on a regular basis to the MDC 
responsible attorney. The MDC responsible attorney should be immediately informed of all 
court and discovery dates . . . .”). 
 67. See Chevron Corp., Chevron Corporation Guidelines for Outside Counsel 
(Guideline F.2), in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 758 (June 1992) 
(“Advance approval from the responsible Chevron attorney is required before you engage in 
any of the following: (1) preparing pretrial motions that would resolve the matter . . . (3) 
preparing discovery motions; . . . (5) selecting or retaining expert witnesses . . . .”); E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., Du Pont Guidelines for Outside Counsel (Guideline 4), in 1 
Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 784 (June 1993) (“The Du Pont staff attorney 
should participate in and approve in advance all decisions regarding important aspects of 
the case and all projects that will require a significant expenditure of time and 
resources.”). 
 68. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Standards for Outside Counsel, in 1 Company Pol’y 
Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 791-92 (May 1995). 
 69. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., Litigation Procedures for Outside Counsel (July 1986) 
(Principle 1), in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 702 (1987). 
 70. Id. (Principle 3). 
 71. See Coleman Co., Sample Engagement Letters and Billing Instruction Form, in 1 
Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 738 (Apr. 1997) (“Except for the interests of 
excess insurance carriers, we retain total control over this file.”). Some guidelines state 
that decisions are made collaboratively by the corporation and the outside counsel. See, 
e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp., Policies for Firms Providing Legal Services to McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation, in 1 Company Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 735 (Apr. 1997) 
(“Substantive pleadings . . . may not be filed or served in any matter until they have been 
reviewed and approved by the [McDonell Douglas Corporation] responsible attorney.”). 
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conveyed to the public. Provisions retaining control and requiring 
consultation accomplish this objective. Often, through its experience 
and familiarity with the circumstances surrounding the 
representation, an entity is in a superior position to assess litigation 
strategy, including which witnesses should be called and the areas in 
which attorneys should focus their efforts. 
 In addition, for businesses and insurers that defend or prosecute 
hundreds or thousands or tens of thousands of lawsuits each year, 
two critical factors underlie their approach to litigation. One is the 
need for consistency, both in approach and in quality. The other is 
the need to achieve an acceptable balance between legal dollars 
invested and the results returned on that investment. 
 Coupled with an auditing mechanism, litigation management 
guidelines provide corporations and insurers the means of 
implementing their litigation philosophies in a consistent manner. 
Such guidelines further enable corporations and insurers to evaluate 
the quality of legal representation both within and across 
jurisdictional lines and to ascertain whether their legal dollars have 
been expended according to their wishes. Chevron Corporation’s 
guidelines, for example, under a category entitled “General 
Expectations,” explain: 
 We want our relationship with outside counsel to be a close 
working one, with expectations and duties running in both 
directions. It is important that our communications be open and 
direct. You should not be offended if we point out instances when 
we believe your work has not been of the quality we expect or has 
not been performed on a cost-effective basis. To the same extent, 
we need to be told when we have failed to fulfill our obligations to 
you (e.g., failure to provide timely or complete responses to 
requests for information).72 
Litigation guidelines used by Overnite Transportation Company, on 
the other hand, approach the same goal from a different direction: 
 One of the realities of the trucking industry marketplace today 
is intensely brutal competition. Essential to our success in this 
environment are productivity and cost control. The need for 
maximizing productivity and efficiency and minimizing cost 
extends to every Overnite functional department, including the 
law department and its outside counsel. To that end, it is essential 
that every effort be made to hold down the cost of legal services.73 
                                                                                                                      
 72. Chevron Corp., Guidelines for Outside Counsel (Guideline A.3), in 1 Company 
Pol’y Statements (Bus. Laws, Inc.) 754-55 (June 1992). 
 73. Overnite Transp. Co., Outside Counsel Guidelines (June 1993), in 1 Outside 
Counsel Management (Am. Corp. Counsel Ass’n) 339 (1994). 
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As these excerpts illustrate, entities value consistency for several 
different, but equally valid, reasons.  
 First, a consistent philosophy and set of rules allow purchasers of 
legal services to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the law 
firms they hire. Commonly, corporations and insurers litigate the 
same matters in multiple jurisdictions over and over again. In order 
to adequately represent their interests (and, in the case of insurers, 
the interests of their insureds as well), they must engage tens or 
sometimes hundreds of firms. Applying the same benchmarks to all 
their firms permits them to fairly judge the firms’ work product and 
relative costs, and to select and reward those firms whose expertise 
and efficiency are most closely aligned with their goals. 
 Second, a lack of consistency in legal representation can create 
extraordinary liability and legal fee exposures. Without a corporate 
litigation policy and the means of implementing it, decisionmaking is 
erratic and subject to the biases of the individual litigation manager 
and attorney. Inconsistent decisions can lead to unnecessary 
countersuits, ruined relationships with business partners and 
customers, and discovery of documents and deposition testimony that 
can be used adversely in subsequent litigation. As one commentator 
noted:  
 It is vital that a corporate defendant set its goals and priorities 
for handling its significant litigation. Cases should not be 
considered “inventory” and ignored once they are put on the shelf 
with an outside trial counsel. Product integrity issues resolved in 
litigation conducted without strong and capable company 
stewardship may result, through inattention, in the termination of 
some company’s product lines.74 
 Third, a lack of consistency needlessly wastes money. 
Corporations and insurers oversee huge volumes of litigation, which 
translates into knowledge of what works and what does not work. 
These clients quickly amass storehouses of information and research 
that aid and guide litigation, eliminating duplicative work and futile 
efforts. Finally, litigation guidelines also benefit the attorneys 
engaged by these businesses, public entities, and carriers. By clearly 
communicating expectations up front to the attorney, guidelines 
provide attorneys with a roadmap of sorts and ensure future 
business so important to the growth and stability of the firm.75 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Edward Lowenberg, Consolidated Defense Experience: Working with Co-
Defendants to Really Minimize Costs, in FIFTH ANNUAL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT 
SUPERCOURSE 75, 78 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5184, 
1994) (discussing the concept of shared outside counsel litigation guidelines in the context 
of a joint defense arrangement), WESTLAW, 497 PLI/Lit 75. 
 75. Notably, litigation guidelines are routine for shared outside counsel in joint 
defense situations. See Lowenberg, supra note 74, at 96. 
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2.   Auditing 
 Like litigation management guidelines, auditing legal bills serves 
the interests and obligations of all parties in the tripartite 
relationship. The audit process improves the quality of legal 
representation by allowing the insurer to monitor the defense 
attorney’s performance and thus ensure that the attorney is 
advancing the litigation goals identified at the outset of the 
representation. In addition, the audit process allows the insurer to 
ensure that the insurer and insured are receiving an effective 
defense, based on reasonable fees, which, in turn, keeps future 
premiums at the lowest possible level. 
 Audit services are best performed by a person or entity with 
experience reviewing attorney billing statements. A client may lack 
the expertise or internal resources to audit the charges effectively. In 
these situations, a client should be entitled to consult with outside 
service vendors, in much the same way that an insurer is entitled to 
retain an accountant to help it adjust the business interruption on a 
fire loss. Indeed, corporate law departments, public entities, and self-
insured businesses routinely engage outside auditors to analyze 
billings of their retained law firms.76 In fact, the Florida Supreme 
Court has actually required the use of third-party auditors in certain 
disciplinary actions.77 
B.   These Practices Do Not Violate Ethics Rules or 
Endanger Privileges 
 The insured’s contractual duty to cooperate, in concert with the 
insurer’s defense obligations, requires disclosures to the insurer that 
are reasonable or necessary to the defense of a claim.78 Further, as 
recognized above, counsel representing more than one client in the 
same matter generally are permitted to share information gleaned 
from the representation among all clients.79 Certainly, “[s]haring of 
information among the co-clients with respect to the matter involved 
in the representation is normal and typically expected.”80 In 
summary, defense counsel’s disclosure of information to justify fees 
facilitates the defense of a claim and serves the mutual interest of 
the insurer and insured in obtaining quality legal representation at 
the lowest possible cost. 
                                                                                                                      
 76. See Syverud, supra note 14, at 183. 
 77. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Valladares, 698 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1997) (requiring an 
attorney, as a condition of probation, to employ an accountant to render reports on his 
operating and trust accounts). 
 78. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Allstate Ins. Co., 653 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1995). 
 79. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. l (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 1996). 
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 Nor does disclosure of legal bills to a third-party auditor endanger 
the attorney-client privilege. In Florida, section 90.502, Florida 
Statutes,81 governs the attorney-client privilege. Under that statute, 
a communication between an attorney and client is “’confidential’ if it 
is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than: 1. Those to 
whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to 
the client.”82 Thus, “the attorney-client privilege ‘extends to the 
necessary intermediaries and agents through whom such 
communications are made.’”83 Similarly, protected work product loses 
its protection only if disclosed to someone likely to pass it on to an 
adversary of the client.84 Accordingly, disclosure of the basis for an 
attorney’s billing statement to an insurer does not violate ethical 
duties of confidentiality and does not lead to the waiver of privileges. 
 These conclusions are not altered because an outside auditing 
firm reviews the billing statements.85 This is rooted in the protection 
granted to disclosures made to outside contractors in furtherance of 
litigation.86 These independent contractors may include expert 
witnesses, expert consultants, computer database companies, 
accounting firms, data processing and storage firms, printing firms, 
photocopying firms, paper disposal firms, or anyone else “further[ing] 
. . . the rendition of legal services to the client.”87 Absent client 
consent for disclosure, these independent contractors have a duty to 
maintain the confidentiality of the information provided to them by 
the attorney.88 The confidential information is being disclosed to 
further the defense of the insured, and the insured is in no way 
exposed to a waiver of privilege.89 Likewise, if an individual is acting 
as an agent for the client, then the communication is confidential.90 
 Moreover, the defense attorney is not precluded by any ethical 
obligation from sharing that information with the independent 
contractor.91 It would defy common sense, for example, to assert that 
                                                                                                                      
 81. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2000). 
 82. Id. § 90.502(1)(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 83. Gerheiser v. Stephens, 712 So. 2d 1252, 1254-55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (quoting 
State v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 424 (N.J. 1957), and City of San Francisco v. Superior 
Court, 231 P.2d 26, 31 (Cal. 1951) (en banc)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. l (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (confidential 
information of co-clients); id. § 120 cmt. f (attorney-client privilege). 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 140(4) & cmt. b 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). 
 85. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1994). 
 86. See id. 
 87. FLA. STAT. § 90.502(1)(c)(1) (2000). 
 88. See § 90.502(2). 
 89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. g 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (attorney-client privilege). 
 90. See Gerheiser v. Stephens, 712 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). 
 91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. f 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 
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an attorney is prohibited—either ethically or legally—from sending 
information that needs to be copied to an outside photocopying 
vendor, or that a client’s permission need be obtained beforehand. A 
defense attorney “may disclose confidential client information for the 
purpose of facilitating the lawyer’s law practice, where no reasonable 
prospect of harm to the client is thereby created and where 
appropriate safeguards against impermissible use or disclosure are 
taken.”92 Indeed, attorneys need not obtain client consent before 
sending detailed time-sheet information to a data processing firm for 
bookkeeping purposes.93 
 This idea is consistent with ethics rules generally, including the 
Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.94 As indicated above, in defending 
a claim an insurer has explicit authority from the insured (the co-
client) to control the case.95 As such, the insurer as co-client and as 
the ceded agent for the insured has the authority to disclose 
information to agents acting on behalf of the insurer, such as 
auditors.96 
 Bill auditing by an insurer is as much a part of the litigation 
process as the functions performed by a defense attorney or a 
retained outside contractor. In these instances, the work being done 
is fundamental to the litigation process; it matters not whether the 
work is performed by the defense attorney, the insurer’s employees, 
or by outside contractors. All of these persons and entities are acting 
in furtherance of the insured’s defense. There is simply no adversity 
of interest or other problem of disclosure that would undercut 
available privileges or lead to the breach of policyholder 
confidences.97 
 Moreover, ethics rules universally prohibit attorneys from 
charging excessive fees.98 The extensive list of factors to be 
                                                                                                                      
Formal Op. 398 (1995) (recognizing that attorneys use outside contractors, and that they 
may do so as long as they “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the company has in 
place, or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of client 
information”). 
 92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. g (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6, http://www.flabar. 
org/lawpractice/Rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001).  
 93. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1364 
(1976); see also, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6. 
 94. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt. 
 95. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19. 
 96. See Gerheiser v. Stephens, 712 So. 2d 1252, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (extending 
attorney-client privilege to necessary intermediaries and agents through whom such 
communications are made). 
 97. The Montana Supreme Court recently concluded that the release of information to 
a third-party auditor requires specific consent of the insured. See In re Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 821 (Mont. 2000). 
As discussed below in Part IV.B, this conclusion is simply unreasonable and unwise. 
 98. For example, The Florida Bar forbids its members from charging or collecting an 
“illegal, prohibited, or clearly excessive fee.” R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(a). 
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considered when determining the reasonableness of legal fees99 is 
clear evidence that fees were meant to be examined as part of the 
litigation process. Auditing is simply a mechanism by which one 
client (the one paying the defense bills) is able to verify its obligation 
to pay for legal services. It is both unrealistic and unlawful for an 
attorney to demand that attorneys’ fees be paid without fully 
justifying the fees. This is simply a matter of attorney accountability. 
 In summary, an attorney does not violate any ethical rules of 
confidentiality when that attorney shares information with the 
carrier or a third-party auditor retained by the carrier to further the 
representation. To claim otherwise would be to state that the 
attorney ethics rules could be used to erode any existing contractual 
obligations the attorney might have or could be used to diminish the 
bargaining position of all purchasers of legal services. In addition, if 
the submission of billing statements to an outside auditor were 
unethical or waived evidentiary privileges, it would be impossible to 
resolve billing disputes among the insurer, insured, and defense 
attorney. Indeed, courts routinely employ outside auditors to 
determine the amount of legal fees to be awarded. No attorney has 
the right to demand a fee from an insurer or any other client without 
providing reasonable justification for that fee. 
IV.   ADVISORY OPINIONS LIMITING LITIGATION 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 Permitting an attorney to cancel or avoid bargained-for 
litigation management guidelines would be crippling to businesses 
trying to compete effectively in the marketplace while facing a 
mounting onslaught of lawsuits. However, under the guise of 
“ethical considerations” one state court100 and at least thirty-two 
bar associations have issued opinions attempting to do just that.101 
Analysis of these opinions reveals that they are typified by a 
number of analytical flaws. Among the most significant are 
issuing opinions in a factual vacuum,102 misapplying existing case 
law,103 failing to recognize the insurer’s status as a co-client (or, at 
                                                                                                                      
 99. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(b). 
 100. See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.2d 806. 
 101. See infra Appendix B. 
 102. See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1 (1999); Haw. Sup. Ct. 
Disciplinary Bd., Formal Ops. 36, 37 (1999); Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 
4 (1998); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 99-01 (1999); Or. State Bar 
Ass’n, Formal Op. 1999-157 (1999); Wis. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. E-99-1 
(1999) (absence of specific hypothetical facts). 
 103. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998) 
(misconstruing United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681 (1st 
Cir. 1997)); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 91 (1993) (same); Ind. State Bar 
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a bare minimum, as an agent of the insured),104 and erroneously 
interpreting ethics rules.105 These are all exacerbated by a tendency 
of the opinions to cite to one another as authority without 
investigating whether the underlying laws of the states are the same 
or whether the cited opinion actually conforms to the law of its own 
state.106 Further, many rely on out-of-state opinions that were 
ultimately invalidated.107 
A.   State Ethics Opinions108 
1.   Contradictions with Substantive Law 
 One of the most common failings of state ethics opinions in this 
area is intruding into areas of substantive law. Not only are issues of 
contract law, for example, outside the jurisdiction of bar staff, but 
bar staff have shown a dangerous tendency to get it wrong. A pointed 
illustration is provided by Florida Bar Staff Opinions 20,591109 and 
                                                                                                                      
Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 3 (1998) (same); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 211 (1993) 
(same); R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18 (1999) (same). 
 104. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 716 (1999) (asserting that 
only the insured is the client); Me. Prof. Ethics Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, 
Op. 164 (1998) (same); S.D. State Bar, Ethics Op. 99-2 (1999) (same); Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999) (same); Vt. Prof’l Responsibility 
Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998) (same); Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195 
(1999) (same); see also Mo. Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Informal Advisory Op. 
No. 980,188 (1998) (referring to insured as “the client”); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., 
Op. 98-36 (1998) (same); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02 
(1999) (describing insured as “the primary client”). 
 105. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999) (failing to 
appreciate the distinction between independent judgment and independent action); Idaho 
State Bar Ass’n Board of Comm’rs, Formal Ethics Op. 136 (1999) (same); Md. State Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (1999) (requiring express consent of insured 
before disclosing information to third-party auditor). 
 106. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999). 
 107. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Colo. Bar 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999); 
Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (1999); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02 (1998); Pa. Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-32 (1998); Tenn. Sup. Ct. 
Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Vt. Prof’l Responsibility 
Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723 
(1998); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02 (1999). 
 108. After this Article was drafted but before publication, the Standing Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association issued Formal 
Opinion 01-421, Ethical Obligations of a Lawyer Working Under Company Guidelines and 
Other Restrictions, Feb. 16, 2001. While the authors have some reservations as to the 
wording of the conclusions reached in the opinion, the authors believe the opinion contains 
(contrary to most state bar association opinions) a thorough factual presentation; excellent, 
comprehensive research; thoughtful and balanced analysis of competing issues; and most 
importantly, sound guidance for attorneys founded upon practical realities.   
 109. Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,591 (1997) (on file with The Fla. Bar), available at 
http://www.dri.org/research/opinions/op6.html. 
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20,762110 and three successor proposed advisory opinions (the 
“PAOs”)111 which were ultimately rejected by Florida’s Board of 
Governors.112 
 Both staff opinions, which underwent no formal review, contain 
the erroneous, extra-jurisdictional statement that “an insurance 
defense lawyer’s client is the insured, not the insurance company.”113 
The question of who is a client, however, is an issue of contract 
law.114 Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court, in In re Proposed Addition 
to the Additional Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in 
Florida115—issued before the staff opinions—recognized that a 
Florida defense attorney may represent both the insurer and the 
insured.116 In fact, The Florida Bar’s Ethics Committee ultimately 
deleted that statement from the PAOs.117 
 Yet even the PAOs continued to analyze the issues as if the 
insurance company were nothing more than a third-party payor for 
legal services and as if a defense attorney cannot represent the 
interests of both an insured and his or her insurance company as co-
clients.118 The PAOs also wrongly denied the authority of the insurer 
to settle cases, despite statutory and contract law to the contrary.119 
This type of assertion is an obvious source of confusion to defense 
counsel. 
 Furthermore, by paying inadequate attention to relevant contract 
law, the opinions risked causing insureds to forfeit the insurer’s duty 
to defend. By requiring the attorney not only to inform the insured 
regarding the attorney’s employment relationship with the insurer, 
                                                                                                                      
 110. Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,762 (1998) (on file with The Fla. Bar), available at 
http://www.dri.org/research/opinions/op5.html. 
 111. See Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-4 (1999), http://www. 
flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-04pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2000); Fla. Bar 
Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3 (1999), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/ 
images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2000); Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., 
Proposed Advisory Op. 99-2, http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-
02pao.pdf (1999) (last visited Nov. 15, 2000). 
 112. See Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar 
(Dec. 15, 2000), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/Board/dec00min.html. 
 113. Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,591 (1997); Fla. Bar Staff, Op. 20,762 (1998). 
 114. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 115. 220 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969). 
 116. Id. at 8; see also supra Part II.A.2. 
 117. See sources cited supra note 111. 
 118. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3, 
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 
2000), with In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules, 220 So. 2d at 8. See also 
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (the Statement). 
 119. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3, 
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 
2000), with Shuster v. South Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 
So. 2d 174, 176 (Fla. 1992). See also IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (the Statement). 
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but also to obtain the consent of the insured,120 they erroneously 
implied that an insured may decline representation by a staff 
attorney. This completely ignores the consequences such an action 
can have under contract law: that is, the insured would possibly 
nullify the insurer’s duty to defend by declining such representation. 
2.   Misinterpretations of the Ethics Rules 
 a.   Erroneous Interpretations of the Confidentiality Rules.—The 
Florida opinions are again typical in misinterpreting the ethics rules. 
For example, PAO 99-2 would have prohibited the release of all 
confidential information to all third parties without first obtaining 
permission from the insured.121 Yet, such an interpretation can be 
reached only by ignoring the exceptions to the nondisclosure 
provisions discussed in Part II above. In view of those exceptions, the 
restrictions imposed by the opinions are simply unwarranted. 
 b.   Confusing Independent Judgment with Independent Action.—
Many opinions also confuse independence of judgment with freedom 
to carry out that judgment without regard to the client’s wishes.122 
For instance, the Florida PAOs sought to prohibit the use of certain 
litigation management guidelines based on the erroneous conclusion 
that such guidelines adversely affect an attorney’s independent 
professional judgment.123 Examination of Florida’s ethics rules 
illustrates this error. For example, Rule 4-1.2 of the Rules Regulating 
The Florida Bar states, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall abide 
by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . 
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to 
be pursued.”124 Furthermore, as the comments to the rule provide: 
The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be 
served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law 
and the lawyer’s professional obligations. Within those limits, a 
client also has a right to consult with the lawyer about the means to 
be used in pursuing those objectives. . . . A clear distinction 
between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn, and in 
                                                                                                                      
 120. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-4, 
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-04pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 
2000), with In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules, 220 So. 2d at 8. See also 
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 18-19 (the Statement). 
 121. Compare Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-2, 
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-02pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 
2000), with R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.6 cmt., http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/ 
rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001); see also IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (the 
Statement). 
 122. See, e.g., Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998). 
 123. See Fla. Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Proposed Advisory Op. 99-3 (1999), http://www. 
flabar.org/newflabar/images/downloads/99-03pao.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2000). 
 124. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2(a), http://www.flabar.org/lawpractice/Rules/ 
rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001). 
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many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint 
undertaking. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume 
responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues but should 
defer to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be 
incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely 
affected.125 
Thus, under Rule 4-1.2, the attorney is responsible for the technical 
and legal tactical issues while the client controls the means to be 
used in pursuing those objectives.126 For instance, an attorney cannot 
file a specific action without the client’s consent.127 Likewise, a client 
is typically able to control whether depositions and research should 
be conducted based on whether the client wishes to incur fees for 
such expenses.128 Because the insured has ceded the right to control 
litigation to the insurer, it is the insurer, as co-client, that controls 
the litigation and the accrual of accompanying fees.129 
 Attorneys clearly must be free to exercise their independent 
professional judgment by forming and voicing their opinions if they 
are to provide the best possible advice to their clients (independent 
judgment). On the other hand, clients, not attorneys, have the right to 
decide which advice to accept and which attorney action to authorize 
(independent action).130 If attorneys are unimpeded by their clients’ 
wishes during the course of the representation, clients are effectively 
held hostage by their own counsel. Absent a material and 
irreconciliable conflict with the insured, to deny insurers the right to 
direct their insureds’ litigation is to negate the right of all clients to 
decide the conduct of their cases. As stated in the preamble to the 
Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, a “lawyer is a representative 
of clients . . . [and] as a representative of clients, a lawyer performs 
various functions.”131 These include acting as adviser, advocate, 
negotiator, and intermediary.132 These valuable functions all require 
the exercise of independent professional judgment, but independence 
of judgment should not be confused with ultimate decisionmaking 
responsibility, which is the prerogative of the client. 
                                                                                                                      
 125. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt. (emphasis added). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See Florida Bar v. Hayden, 583 So. 2d 1016, 1017 (Fla. 1991). 
 128. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt. 
 129. As noted earlier, if the insurer’s decisions regarding fees are not made in good 
faith, the insured has a remedy in an action for bad faith. See supra text accompanying 
note 19. 
 130. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt. 
 131. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR preamble to ch. 4. 
 132. See id. 
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3.   The Imagined Threat to Attorney-Client Privilege 
 Several opinions cite to United States v. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology133 for the proposition that the disclosure of information by 
an insurer or attorney to a third-party auditor waives the attorney-
client privilege and thus may be detrimental to the insured.134 This is 
simply untrue. As noted above, under the common interest doctrine, 
information may be shared among co-clients and their agents acting 
pursuant to confidentiality agreements.135 
 Furthermore, the MIT opinion does nothing to undermine that 
black letter law. The actual facts of that case (which are not readily 
apparent from reading the opinion itself) reflect that the information 
disclosed in that case was disclosed to the opposing party,136 and not 
to a party that falls within the scope of the common-interest doctrine 
or to a party necessary to properly effect the representation.137 Thus, 
it is inappropriate to rely on this case for the proposition that the use 
of third-party auditors poses a threat to the insured. 
4.   Issuance Without a Formal Process 
 Moreover, complicating these errors, most ethics opinions are 
issued without any court approval process, or other approval process, 
for allowing the contents of the ethics opinions to be contested.138 
Again, Florida Staff Opinions 20,591 and 20,762 offer a good 
example. Both of these opinions were prepared by Florida Bar ethics 
staff without any formal approval process. After these staff opinions 
were issued, formal advisory opinions (the PAOs) addressing the 
same issues and containing much of the same language were 
proposed and ultimately contested before The Florida Bar’s Board of 
Governors.139 
                                                                                                                      
 133. 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 134. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Alaska Bar 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1 (1999); Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 
107 (1999); Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 4 (1998); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Advisory 
Ethics Op. E-404 (1998); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 246 (1999); Or. State Bar Ass’n, 
Formal Op. 1999-157 (1999); R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17 (1999). 
 135. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 136. See MIT, 129 F.3d at 681-82 (stating that MIT had previously disclosed the 
information to an auditing agency of the Department of Defense, but then asserted 
privilege as to the IRS). 
 137. See Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing at 
113-14 (Nov. 4, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.) (statement of Bill 
Barker). 
 138. See, e.g., FLA. BAR PROCEDURES FOR RULING ON QUESTIONS OF ETHICS Rule 2(c), 
http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/memberservices/ethics/ethrules.html (last visited Oct. 29, 
2000). 
 139. See sources cited supra note 111. 
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 As the AIA and other insurers argued,140 the PAOs were outside 
the jurisdiction of the Professional Ethics Committee, in part because 
they attempted to establish broad policy tantamount to rules 
governing bar member’s conduct—without the benefit of a 
particularized set of facts regarding specific, contemplated conduct of 
a member of the Bar.141 This, in turn, led to substantive errors in the 
PAOs. On December 15, 2000, the Board of Governors unanimously 
rejected the PAOs because of “concerns regarding the procedures 
under which the opinions were promulgated.”142 
 Further, state ethics opinions are often drafted by bar staff 
attorneys143 who are unlikely to have much experience with 
evaluating ethics in the specific context of insurance defense. Most 
likely, the failure to provide adequate process is a result of the 
“advisory” nature of almost all state bar ethics opinions. However, 
even if such opinions cannot be used to bring a disciplinary action 
against an attorney, they are nonetheless official pronouncements of, 
if not the Bar, the very counsel that may be charged with bringing 
disciplinary actions against attorneys. Thus, many ethics opinions 
have the potential to constitute essentially new ethics rules, to the 
extent that they represent broad policy decisions by individuals with 
the powers of prosecutorial discretion. It is therefore unsettling for 
these types of issues to be resolved without any proper rulemaking 
process. 
5.   Reliance on Opinions of Other States 
 At least eighteen state bar ethics opinions cite to, rely on, or claim 
to be consistent with, ethics opinions of other states.144 However, in 
                                                                                                                      
 140. See Fla. Bar Board Review Committee on Professional Ethics, transcript of 
hearing at 6-25 (Dec. 14, 2000) (on file with authors) (statements of Stephen Grimes and 
Steve Day). 
 141. The Florida Bar’s procedures provides that members of The Florida Bar may 
request an advisory opinion from Bar Staff and then from the Committee “about their 
contemplated professional conduct . . . .” FLA. BAR PROCEDURES FOR RULING ON QUESTIONS 
OF ETHICS Rule 2(a), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/memberservices/ethics/ethrules.html 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2000) (emphasis added). In fact, Rule 2(b) specifically provides that 
“[e]ach request shall present in detail all operative facts upon which the request is based, 
including a statement affirming that the inquiring member is requesting an advisory 
ethics opinion concerning the member’s own contemplated conduct.” Rule 2(b). 
 142. Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar 
(Dec. 15, 2000), http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/Board/dec00min.html. 
 143. See FLA. BAR PROCEDURES FOR RULING ON QUESTIONS OF ETHICS Rule 2(c). 
 144. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Colo. Bar 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 91 (1993); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999); 
Idaho State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Comm’rs, Formal Ethics Op. 136 (1999); Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 
Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct 98-08 (1999); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, 
Op. 99-01 (1999); Ky. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. E-404 (1998); Md. State Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (2000); Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 246 (1993); N.Y. 
State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 716 (1999); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Ethics and 
Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02 (1998); Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal 
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making that claim, those ethics opinions do not analyze the cited 
states’ substantive law to determine whether the law in those states 
is consistent with the law of the state in which the opinion is 
issued.145 Further, some have cited to opinions that either 
contradicted their own states’ case law or were subsequently 
withdrawn or overruled.  
 A pointed illustration is the reliance of other states, such as 
Vermont, on Florida Staff Opinions 20,591 and 20,762. At least 
eleven states cite to Florida Bar Staff Opinions 20,591 or 20,762 for 
support,146 despite the substantive and procedural flaws outlined 
above. In fact, the statement that “an insurance defense lawyer’s 
client is the insured, not the insurance company,” was repeated 
verbatim in Vermont Professional Responsibility Committee, 
Advisory Ethics Opinion 98-7, which cites to Florida Bar Staff 
Opinion 20,762 for support.147 Yet, as noted above, this statement 
contradicted Florida’s substantive law. In fact, it appears to 
contradict Vermont’s substantive law as well.148 
 In short, by relying on unapproved, legally incorrect Florida staff 
opinions, Vermont and other states have perpetuated ethics opinions 
that are based in large part on erroneous conclusions and 
supposition. Because of the potential for error, no foreign opinion 
should ever be used as the basis for an ethics opinion unless: (1) the 
foreign opinion was issued based on a proper process; (2) the foreign 
opinion is first compared with the underlying law of that state’s 
jurisdiction (including substantive law regarding the formation of 
attorney-client relationships and the law of insurance); (3) the law of 
the foreign jurisdiction is then compared with the law of the issuing 
state; and (4) the underlying facts of the foreign opinion provide an 
                                                                                                                      
Op. 1999-157 (1999); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, 
Informal Op. 98-32 (1998); R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18 (1999); Tenn. 
Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Vt. Prof’l 
Responsibility Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal 
Ethics, Op. 1723 (1998); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02 
(1999). 
 145. See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999). 
 146. See Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. RO-98-02 (1998); Colo. Bar 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 (1999); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999); 
Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics Docket 99-7 (1999); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n 
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02 (1998); Pa. Bar Ass’n 
Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-32 (1998); Tenn. Sup. Ct. 
Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999); Vt. Prof’l Responsibility 
Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723 
(1998); W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal Ethics Op. 99-02 (1999). 
 147. Vt. Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Advisory Ethics Op. 98-7 (1998). 
 148. See In re Illuzi, 632 A.2d 346, 355 (Vt. 1993) (finding that the plaintiff’s attorney 
violated ethics rules by speaking directly to the insurer instead of communicating through 
the attorney hired to defend the insurer). The dissenting opinion in Illuzzi disagreed only 
as to the sanction and affirmed that at the beginning of the litigation, the attorney may 
represent both the insured and the insurer. See id. at 492 (Allen, C.J., dissenting). 
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adequate basis for applying the state’s ethics rules in the proper legal 
context. 
B.   The Montana Decision 
 Even in the one opinion where a state supreme court has actually 
addressed the use of third-party auditors and billing guidelines, the 
legal analysis is illogical and fundamentally flawed. In In re Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and 
Procedures,149 the Montana Supreme Court concluded that billing 
guidelines per se interfere with the independent judgment of defense 
counsel150 and that defense counsel cannot disclose billing 
information to third-party auditors without first obtaining the 
insured’s contemporaneous and fully informed consent.151 The court 
based its decision on a number of irrational factors and conclusions. 
The court: (1) concluded that under ethics rules, the insurer is not a 
co-client of defense counsel, while upholding prior Montana decisions 
holding just the opposite;152 (2) concluded that those prior Montana 
decisions finding that the insurer and insured were co-clients of 
defense counsel were inapposite because they did not address the 
relationship under the Rules of Professional Conduct;153 (3) defined 
independence of professional judgment as freedom of independent 
action;154 (4) treated mere potential conflicts of interest as actual 
conflicts of interest;155 and (5) treated the disclosure of detailed 
billing statements to a third-party auditor as disclosure to a potential 
adversary.156 Each of these conclusions is flawed. 
 First, as explained above, client status is not afforded by the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.157 Rather, it is a function of the substantive 
contract law of the state.158 Ethics rules address attorney obligations 
and behavior toward clients and nonclients alike.159 Clearly, those 
obligations will differ depending on whether an affected person is a 
client, a represented party, a witness, an officer of the court, or even 
a stranger to the proceeding. But the rules do not determine the 
                                                                                                                      
 149. 2 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2000). 
 150. Id. at 815. 
 151. Id. at 821-22. 
 152. See id. at 810-14. 
 153. See id. at 810. 
 154. See id. at 817. 
 155. See id. at 814. 
 156. See id. at 821. 
 157. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 158. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 159. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR preamble to ch. 4, http://www.flabar.org/ 
lawpractice/Rules/rrtfbch4.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2001). 
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affected person’s status; they merely set forth the obligations 
accompanying the person’s status.160 
 Second, the Montana Supreme Court’s rationales for assigning 
client status for purposes of substantive law and withholding it for 
purposes of ethics law reveal a glaring inconsistency. If the total 
control afforded by the insurance contract suffices to make insurers 
liable for the conduct of defense counsel and suffices to make 
insurers “clients” within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, 
then it does not logically follow that an insurer cannot exercise the 
control afforded by the insurance contract because no attorney is 
permitted to follow its instructions under ethics rules. It is an empty 
gesture to note that Montana case law permits the insurer to control 
the defense of covered claims but to nonetheless conclude, using a 
tortured interpretation of ethics rules, that the insurer cannot 
exercise that control. Arguably, the Montana Supreme Court’s 
decision that contractual control must give way to the ethics rules 
would undermine the law of bad faith in Montana. 
 Third, as noted above, equating freedom of action with 
independence of judgment is erroneous because it would allow an 
attorney’s advisory role to expropriate actual decisionmaking 
authority typically reserved to the client or its agents.161 As the 
United States Supreme Court determined in Evans v. Jeff D.,162 
attorneys must be free to offer candid advice and to recommend a 
course of action to those who retain them.163 However, the choice to 
act or refrain from acting on the attorney’s advice must always be a 
separate decision for the client, or its assignee or agent, to make.164 
Despite this fact, the Montana court concluded that billing and 
practice rules violate the Rules of Professional Conduct by interfering 
with defense counsels’ freedom of action.165 
 The ethics rules require attorneys to ensure they retain the 
freedom to give advice,166 but they limit what action attorneys can 
take in the context of the clients’ decisionmaking authority.167 To the 
extent that the insured-client has ceded that decisionmaking 
                                                                                                                      
 160. Under the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (after which both Florida’s 
and Montana’s rules were modeled), Rules 4.1 through 4.4 all relate to the attorney’s 
behavior toward nonclients, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.3 
(1998) (regarding dealings with unrepresented persons), while Rules 1.1 through 1.17 
detail obligations toward clients, see, e.g., Rule 1.4 (regarding communicating with a 
client). 
 161. See supra Part IV.A.2.b. 
 162. 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
 163. Id. at 728. 
 164. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt. 
 165. See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules and 
Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 815 (Mont. 2000). 
 166. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7(b). 
 167. See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 cmt. 
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authority to another, the attorney’s right to act is still limited. The 
Montana court’s statements seem to imply that the threat of 
withholding payment always acts to chill an attorney’s independent 
professional judgment168 (because, for example, the attorney does not 
want to risk harm to a future stream of business). This is nonsense 
because the same would be true in any situation where an attorney 
gets most of his or her business from a few large clients. At bottom, 
any issue of payment is a matter between the attorney and the client, 
not a matter to be resolved in the name of ethics. 
 Fourth, the court fails to appreciate the critical difference between 
merely potential and actual conflicts of interest. The court notes that 
“[b]efore the final resolution of any claim against an insured, there 
clearly exists the potential for conflicts of interest to arise.”169 This, 
however, is true in every situation involving multiple clients or an 
agency relationship. At this level of abstraction, virtually no legal 
relationship is immune to a potential conflict of interest. 
 However, the ethics rules (and supporting case law) deal with 
actualities, not mere potentialities. The Tennessee Supreme Court in 
In re Youngblood,170 a case ironically cited with approval by the 
Montana Supreme Court in its decision,171 specifically based its 
holding on a rejection of potential conflict as a basis for overturning 
an ethical opinion adverse to insurers.172 The Tennessee court stated 
that “[b]ecause the opinion bases its finding upon the potential for 
conflict in the relationship of employer-employee rather than 
particular facts which demonstrate there is, in fact, a conflict of 
interest, it does not reflect a proper interpretation of the Code [of 
Professional Conduct].”173 Tellingly, the three examples of potential 
conflict used by the Montana court174 are all examples of actual 
conflict and would fall outside the community of interests upon 
which the insurers rely when giving directions to defense attorneys. 
In none of these cases would litigation guidelines even be in use. 
 Finally, the Montana court erroneously assumes that cost control 
measures are, by their nature, “adversarial.”175 This cannot be true. 
Otherwise, insurers would not be able to audit an attorney’s bills 
internally. More importantly, no payor for legal services (whether 
client or not) would be able to scrutinize the attorney’s bills without 
running the risk of creating an adversarial relationship. 
                                                                                                                      
 168. See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.3d at 815. 
 169. Id. at 814. 
 170. 895 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1995). 
 171. See In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.3d at 815. 
 172. See In re Youngblood, 895 S.W.2d at 330. 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. See In re Rules of Pro’fl Conduct, 2 P.3d at 813.  
 175. Id. at 821. 
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V.   INSURANCE PRACTICES SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE AND THE 
STATEMENT OF INSURED CLIENT’S RIGHTS 
 In early 1999, The Florida Bar, like many other bar associations 
throughout the country, was asked to address issues related to the 
insurance tripartite relationship.176 The Bar examined these issues 
through two separate committees working on parallel tracts: the 
Professional Ethics Committee (“Ethics Committee”) and the 
Insurance Practices Special Study Committee (“IPSSC”). The IPSSC 
was created by the Bar’s leadership and was charged with: 
protect[ing] the public and those insured by policies of insurance 
issued in the State of Florida from the business practices of certain 
insurance companies that may (1) constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law by nonlawyer employees of the insurers; (2) give 
rise to conflicts of interest or other violations of the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar by defense counsel; (3) compromise the 
quality of the defense provided to Florida insureds; or (4) fail to 
adequately inform Florida insureds of the limitations and 
restrictions imposed upon defense counsel by the insurers and the 
ethical concerns that arise from those limitations and 
restrictions.177 
As noted above, the recommendations of the Ethics Committee were 
ultimately rejected. The recommendations of the IPSSC, however, 
were accepted. 
A.   Participatory Process Leads to Workable Solutions Consistent 
with Substantive Law 
 The IPSSC was an appropriate body for examining factual issues 
and making recommendations for the adoption of rules governing the 
professional conduct of attorneys.178 To that end, the IPSSC engaged 
in an exhaustive fact-finding process. The IPSSC held two full days 
of public hearings, heard extensively from interested parties 
representing conflicting positions on the issues before it, prepared 
and received responses to surveys addressing these issues, and 
collected volumes of information in this regard.179 The IPSSC also 
allowed and welcomed interested parties to both comment and 
participate at all of its more than eleven meetings (including full 
committee and subcommittee meetings).180 
                                                                                                                      
 176. This information is based on personal converstations between the authors and the 
Board of Governor’s members.  
 177. IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.  
 178. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 2-8.1, 2-8.2.  
 179. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3, 6. 
 180. See id. at 6. In contrast, one of the authors attended the Ethics Committee’s last 
two meetings in January and March 2000, which specifically prohibited any public 
testimony regarding the PAOs. Additionally, the author attended the Committee’s three-
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 At the conclusion of its work, the IPSSC issued a final report 
making several recommendations to the Board of Governors of The 
Florida Bar,181 the most significant of which was the proposal of the 
Statement of Insured Client’s Rights182 (the Statement) and an 
accompanying implementation rule governing distribution of the 
Statement.183 The Statement was developed to facilitate an attorney’s 
ethical responsibilities in insurance defense representation and to 
assist insured clients in understanding their basic rights.184 Notably, 
however, the IPSSC specifically noted in its comments to the 
proposed rule that there was a potential for ethical risks any time an 
attorney undertakes the representation of multiple clients.185 
 The work of the IPSSC also recognizes the import of the tripartite 
relationship, the contractual obligations of both the insurer and the 
insured, the highly variable nature of insurance, and the 
impracticality of establishing a statement of rights or a rule 
applicable to all forms of insurance.186 In fact, the comments to the 
Statement specifically exclude workers’ compensation insurance from 
its scope.187 Further, the IPSSC’s report acknowledges that, under 
most policies, the insurer pays for and controls the defense.188 
 The Statement was designed to assist the attorney in explaining 
to the insured how the representation will be handled.189 The 
Statement does not prohibit guidelines or otherwise undermine the 
provisions of the insurance contract.190 Rather, it advises the insured 
that the insurer may impose guidelines, and that the attorney must 
notify the insured if the attorney is denied authorization to provide a 
service or action the attorney believes, in his or her independent 
professional judgment, to be necessary.191 The Statement and 
implementing rule reflect a recognition that: (1) the attorney may 
have a duty to share confidential information with the insurer,192 (2) 
insurers frequently have a contractual right to make the final 
                                                                                                                      
hour hearing on the original PAOs during which the Committee heard only limited 
testimony.  
 181. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-29. 
 182. See id. at 17-22.  
 183. See id. at 17. The IPSSC also recommended the implementation of CLE courses 
regarding the tripartite relationship, provided a copy of its record to the Florida 
Department of Insurance for review, and suggested that The Florida Bar Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Committee should review any issues regarding the unauthorized practice 
of law since it was a more appropriate forum to address those issues. See id. at 23-27. 
 184. See id. at 2. 
 185. See id. at 20-21. 
 186. See id. at 13-16. 
 187. See id. at 21. 
 188. See id. at 18.  
 189. See id. at 16.  
 190. See id. at 18.  
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. 
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decision regarding settlement of a claim,193 and (3) it is sometimes 
impractical in the circumstances of insurance defense practice to 
require a attorney to obtain an insured’s consent before taking 
action.194 In essence, the Statement is consistent with and assists the 
ethical obligations of an attorney by promoting a mutual 
understanding of the attorney’s role in the particular representation 
and providing an opportunity for insureds to communicate their 
preferences to the lawyer; but it does not undermine existing law 
governing the tripartite relationship and the insurance contract. 
Further, the Statement is fully consistent with Florida ethics rules.195 
 This is the critical difference between the Statement and the 
ethics opinions being issued by various state bar associations. The 
chart in Appendix C illustrates these distinctions in more detail.196 
The distinctions outlined in the appendix show that, as currently 
framed, the IPSSC’s recommendations are sensible, realistic, and 
grounded in practical application. In contrast, most ethics opinions 
(as well as the Montana decision) are vague, unrealistic, and 
unworkable. 
B.   Ethics Regulation and Economic Interests 
 The IPSSC heard extensive testimony regarding the important 
distinction between illegitimate economic interference and legitimate 
regulation of attorneys’ ethics.197 Many commentators correctly 
asserted that attorney disgruntlement and complaints regarding 
insurer litigation management practices—as well as the amount and 
type of services for which an insurer will pay—are purely economic 
issues affecting business relationships.198 That is, these practices 
become ethics issues only if an insurer actually induces an attorney 
to behave unethically.199 
 Obviously, attorneys must be able to offer candid advice and 
recommend a course of action to those who retain them; this is what 
is meant by exercising independence of judgment. As long as the 
defense attorney is able to exercise independent judgment by 
recommending a course of action to the insurer and the insured co-
                                                                                                                      
 193. See id. at 19. 
 194. See id. at 21. 
 195. In fact, the proposed rule specifically states, “Nothing in the Statement . . . shall 
be deemed to augment or detract from any substantive or ethical duty of a lawyer . . . .” Id. 
at 17. 
 196. See infra Appendix C. 
 197. See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 198. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing 
at 146-47 (Nov. 19, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.) (statement of 
Charles Silver). 
 199. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing 
at 129-30 (Nov. 4, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.) (statement of Bill 
Barker). 
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clients and to actually perform the services needed to protect their 
interests, the state bar associations have no jurisdiction to intervene 
in the economic relationship between the defense attorney and the 
insurer. Even though the IPSSC heard extensively from interested 
parties on these issues, not a single case was presented to the IPSSC 
in which an insured was actually harmed by third-party bill review, 
litigation guidelines, or the use of staff counsel to carry out the 
representation.200 
 Ethics opinions that single out one segment of the Bar to the 
potential benefit of another segment or that artificially standardize 
the cost of legal services raise serious questions of unfair 
competition. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the 
practice of law is both a profession and a business.201 Yet, the Court 
has also recognized that “[t]he nature of an occupation, standing 
alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act . . . .”202 As a 
result, the Court has not hesitated to apply the antitrust laws to 
those attorneys who have used the self-regulatory process or the 
legal “profession” to shield anticompetitive business behavior.203 If a 
court agrees that there is no evidentiary basis for finding that 
insurers’ practices result in actual harm to insureds—or that a 
committee lacked jurisdiction to issue non-fact-specific 
pronouncements that amount to surreptitious rulemaking—then 
members of the public and others, including the courts, may conclude 
that such ethics opinions are an illegal act motivated by economic 
interest. 
 The interests of some attorneys in protecting their own incomes 
are directly at odds with the interests of insurance consumers in 
purchasing coverage at prices not inflated by unnecessary defense 
costs. State bar associations ought not exploit ethics rules to advance 
attorney interests over those of their insured clients. Clearly, 
economic protectionism and competitive restraints are not legitimate 
purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct or ethics opinions 
interpreting those rules. 
                                                                                                                      
 200. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Ins. Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing 
at 1-265 (Nov. 4, 1999) (available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.); Fla. Bar Ins. 
Practices Special Study Comm., transcript of public hearing at 1-308 (Nov. 19, 1999) 
(available at The Fla. Bar, Tallahassee, Fla.). 
 201. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975). 
 202. Id. at 787. 
 203. See id. at 791 (“The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited 
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive 
practices for the benefit of its members.”); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 
U.S. 411, 422-25 (1990) (holding that a boycott by a group of court-appointed criminal 
attorneys aimed at increasing compensation for taking criminal cases of indigent 
defendants constituted a per se violation of federal antitrust law); see also Hoover v. 
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 582-84 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing occupational 
restrictions to medieval guilds). 
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VI.   CONCLUSION 
 The various ethics opinions issued recently by state bar 
associations, as well as the Montana decision, essentially seek to 
impose a remedy where there is no problem. Absent an actual conflict 
between an insurer and an insured, there are simply no existing 
ethical dilemmas in need of solution by way of ethics or court 
opinions. Indeed, the only dilemma is one of economics, which is 
simply a contractual issue between the insurer and the defense 
attorney. Further, these ethics opinions seemingly discriminate 
against the insurance industry without a reasonable basis for the 
distinction and frequently contradict clear legal precedent. In the 
overwhelming majority of states, that precedent has unquestionably 
sanctioned the insurance contract and the duties, responsibilities, 
and rights established thereunder. Under that precedent, defense 
counsel owes a duty to both the insurer and the insured, and the 
insurer has an obligation to act in the best interests of the insured.204  
 Unlike the ethics opinions, the Statement of Insured Client’s 
Rights acts to facilitate, not undermine, those obligations. The 
authors believe that the Statement provides a great example to other 
state bars of finding a responsible, balanced way to handle business 
issues between attorneys and insurers in a way that aids insurance 
consumers without jeopardizing the benefits they receive when they 
buy liability insurance. This is a welcome change from the 
misguided, closed processes which have produced opinions that 
potentially damage the nature of liability insurance in those states. 
 All attorneys are bound by the rules regulating their professional 
conduct. Moreover, the need for qualified attorneys with high ethical 
standards is obviously essential. However, little or no evidence exists 
that any ethics complaints relating to conflicts of interest have been 
filed against attorneys acting within the insurance tripartite 
relationship. Further, there is simply no evidence that the use of 
outside auditing or litigation guidelines has harmed any insured (or 
that there is no existing adequate remedy should such harm occur). 
Rather, it is the ethics opinions themselves that will harm insureds 
by undermining insurance contracts and causing an increase in 
premiums based on the corresponding cost in unchecked attorneys 
fees. Where insureds have not been harmed, it is simply 
unconscionable to adopt ethics rules that will increase litigation costs 
and premiums and single out the insurance industry without just 
cause. The Statement of Insured Client’s Rights represents a viable, 
alternative mechanism for promoting the ethical obligations of the 
defense attorney in the tripartite relationship—without undermining 
                                                                                                                      
 204. See, for example, the recent decision in Paradigm Ins. Co. v. The Longerman Law 
Offices, P.A., 2001 Ariz. LEXS 87 (Ariz. 2001). 
2001]  TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP 891 
 
existing law or the insurance contract. It is thus hoped that the 
Florida Supreme Court will take the lead in this area by adopting 
this refreshing approach to the issue. 
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APPENDIX A: CLIENT STATUS IN THE STATES 
1.   Jurisdictions Recognizing Dual-Client Status in the 
Tripartite Relationship 
JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Alabama 
Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 198 (Ala. 
1988) (stating that when insurance company 
retains attorney to defend action against insured, 
attorney represents insured as well as insurer in 
furthering the interests of each other). 
Alaska 
Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 
F.3d 1322, 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that 
insured and insurer are both represented by the 
attorney as long as there is no conflict of interest). 
Arizona 
Paradigm Ins. Co. v. The Longerman Law Offices, 
P.A., 2001 Ariz. LEXS 87 (Ariz. 2001) (explaining 
that where there is no conflict a defense attorney 
can represent both the insurer and insured, and the 
attorney owes a duty to both). 
California 
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Berger, Kahn, Shafton, Moss, 
Figler, Simon & Gladstone, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 534, 
542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing that the 
attorney has two clients: the insured and insurer). 
Delaware 
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. 
Co., 623 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(discussing the relationship among different 
defendants to determine whether documents were 
privileged; court suggests the attorney may 
represent both the insurer and insured).  
District of 
Columbia 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 384 F.2d 316, 317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (finding 
that the attorney acted as insurer’s representative 
while defending insured).  
Florida 
In re Proposed Addition to the Additional Rules 
Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Fla., 220 So. 2d 
6, 8 (Fla. 1969) (finding that both salaried and non-
salaried insurance attorneys may represent insurer 
and insured if there is no conflict). 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Georgia 
Coscia v. Cunningham, 299 S.E.2d 880, 881 (Ga. 
1983) (recognizing that an attorney represents both 
the insured and insurer).  
Hawaii 
Finley v. Home Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Haw. 
1998) (attorney can not represent both insurer and 
insured when there is a conflict, and citing 
authority that attorney represents them both when 
there is no conflict). 
Idaho 
Pendlebury v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 P.2d 
129, 134 (Idaho 1965) (recognizing that the 
attorney may represent both; when there is a 
conflict, the attorney may be in an awkward 
situation and cannot take a position adverse to the 
interest of his client). 
Illinois 
Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus 
Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 329 (Ill. 1991) 
(“[W]hen insurer retains attorney to defend 
insured, attorney represents both insured and 
insurer in furthering the interests of each.”). 
Indiana 
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151, 160-61 
(Ind. 1999) (recognizing that the attorney 
represents both the insured and insurer; dual 
representation is permissible even when the 
attorney was in-house counsel for the insurer, 
because their interests are aligned). 
Iowa 
Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 920, 
923 (Iowa 1958) (stating that the attorney 
represented both the insured and insurer, and the 
fact that another selects and pays for the attorney 
does not control the attorney-client relationship), 
cited with approval in Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 
530 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Iowa 1995). 
Kansas 
Glenn v. Fleming, 781 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1989) (finding that the insured’s attorney 
represented insurer as well, and insurer had a right 
to control and direct the litigation), aff’d in part & 
rev’d in part, 799 P.2d 79 (Kan. 1990). 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Louisiana 
Hodges v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 433 
So. 2d 125, 132 (La. 1983) (recognizing that the 
attorney represented both the insurer and insured); 
Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401, 409 (La. Ct. 
App. 1968) (finding that an attorney may 
simultaneously represent the insured and insurer). 
Maryland 
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. McConnaughy, 179 A.2d 117, 
121 (Md. 1962) (stating that an attorney can 
represent insured and insurer unless a conflict 
develops). 
Massachusetts 
McCourt Co. v. FPC Properties, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 
1234, 1235 (Mass. 1982) (“The law firm is attorney 
for the insured as well as the insurer.”). 
Minnesota 
Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kleman, 255 N.W.2d 231, 
232 (Minn. 1977) (finding “no conflict of interest in 
the representation of an insurance company and an 
insured by a single law firm”). 
Mississippi 
Moeller v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So. 
2d 1062, 1070 (Miss. 1996) (recognizing that an 
attorney has two separate and distinct clients, the 
insured and the insurer); Hartford Accident & 
Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 265 (Miss. 
1988) (recognizing that the attorney may represent 
the insured and insurer, but insured’s interests are 
paramount if a conflict arises). 
Missouri 
In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 
1987) (stating that an attorney may represent the 
insured and the insurer). 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Nebraska 
Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stoker, 48 N.W.2d 623, 632 
(Neb. 1951) (stating attorney can not represent 
both insurer and insured when their interests 
conflict); Shahan v. Hilker, 488 N.W.2d 577, 581 
(Neb. 1992) (“‘[C]ommunication made by an insured 
to his liability insurance company, concerning an 
event which may be made the basis of a claim 
against him covered by the policy, is a privileged 
communication, as being between attorney and 
client, if the policy requires the company to defend 
him through its attorney, and the communication is 
intended for the information or assistance of the 
attorney in so defending him.’”). 
Nevada 
Campbell v. Maestro, 996 P.2d 412, 414 (Nev. 2000) 
(explaining that a “dual agency” relationship exists 
between the insured, insurer, and attorney, and the 
insurer has the right to control the litigation); 
Stubli v. Big D Int’l Trucks, Inc., 810 P.2d 785, 788 
(Nev. 1991) (Rose, J., dissenting) (recognizing 
attorney represents insured and insurer). 
New 
Hampshire 
Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 A.2d 
781, 784 (N.H. 1971) (finding communications 
between insurer and insured and the attorney were 
not privileged as between them because they were 
both clients of the attorney in the previous action). 
New Jersey 
Lieberman v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 419 A.2d 
417, 424 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing attorney has two 
clients, the insured and insurer unless a conflict 
arises, then the attorney may not continue to 
represent both); Gray v. Commercial Union Ins. 
Co., 468 A.2d 721, 725 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1983). 
New York 
Goldberg v. American Home Assurance Co., 439 
N.Y.S.2d 2, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (stating 
attorney represented both insurer and insured).  
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Ohio 
Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.E.2d 
550, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (“We hold that both 
Nationwide [the insurer] as well as . . . its insured, 
were clients of the legal counsel retained by 
Nationwide.”). 
Oregon 
In re Conduct of O’Neal, 683 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Or. 
1984) (referencing dual representation of insurer 
and insured as example of situations where 
attorney can represent multiple clients if it is 
obvious the lawyer can represent the interests of 
each client without conflict).  
Pennsylvania 
Swedloff v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 187 A.2d 152, 
152-53 (Pa. 1963) (referring to the insurance 
company and the insured as clients of the attorney); 
Molitoris v. Woods, 618 A.2d 985, 989 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992) (recognizing attorney can represent both 
an insured and insurer’s subrogation interest). 
Rhode Island 
Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397, 403 
(R.I. 1968) (finding that if there is no conflict, or the 
insured consents, an attorney may represent both 
the insured and the insurer), abrogated on other 
grounds by Peerless Ins. Co. v. Viegas, 667 A.2d 
785 (R.I. 1995).  
South Carolina 
Chitty v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D 
37, 41-42 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (recognizing attorney 
represented insurer and insured; therefore, 
communications were not privileged).  
Vermont 
In re Illuzzi, 632 A.2d 346, 355 (Vt. 1993) (finding 
plaintiff’s attorney violated ethics rules by speaking 
directly to insurer instead of communicating 
through the attorney hired to defend insured; 
dissent as to sanction affirms that, at the beginning 
of the litigation, an attorney may represent both an 
insured and insurer, but if a conflict arises, he may 
only represent the insured). 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Virginia 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 366 S.E.2d 
93, 97 (Va. 1988) (“During their representation of 
both insurer and insured, attorneys have the duty 
to convey settlement offers to the insured . . . .”); 
Norman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 239 S.E.2d 902, 
907 (Va. 1978) (“[A]n insurer’s attorney, employed 
to represent an insured, is bound by the same high 
standards . . . .”). 
Washington 
Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1999) (noting that normally an attorney 
operates on behalf of two clients, the insurer and 
the insured).  
Wisconsin 
Roeske v. Deifenbach, 226 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Wis. 
1975) (recognizing the attorney represented both 
the insured and insurer, but on appeal this was not 
appropriate because there was a conflict of 
interest). 
Wyoming 
Suchta v. Robinett, 596 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Wyo. 
1979) (suggesting an attorney represents insurer 
and insured: “Both clients, the paying one and the 
one who had the company’s attorney assigned to 
him . . . .”). 
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2.   Jurisdictions Apparently Rejecting Dual-Client Status in the 
Tripartite Relationship 
JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Connecticut 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
730 A.2d 51, 63 (Conn. 1999) (stating the attorney’s 
duty is to his client, the insured, and not to the 
insurer); but see King v. Guiliani, No. CV92-
0290380-S, 1993 WL 284462, at *6 (Conn. Super. 
July 27, 1993) (stating attorney can represent 
insurer and insured unless conflict arises). 
Kentucky 
American Ins. Ass’n v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 917 
S.W.2d 568, 572 (Ky. 1996) (refusing to disturb 
ethics opinion, the court stated that the interests of 
the insured and the insurer are not always alike, 
and the attorney’s duty is to the insured, not the 
one who is paying him, the insurer); but see Moore 
v. Roberts ex rel. Roberts, 684 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 
1982) (acknowledging that the insured and insurer 
were represented by the same counsel and strongly 
advising attorney that the attorney choose one 
client where conflict such as coverage dispute 
exists). 
Michigan 
Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating 
Co., 496 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) 
(stating that “[n]o attorney-client relationship 
exists between an insurance company and the 
attorney representing the insurance company’s 
insured”), aff’d, 519 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. 1994); 
Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294 (Mich. 
1991). 
Montana 
In re Rules of Prof’l Conduct & Insurer Imposed 
Billing Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 814 (Mont. 
2000) (holding that “the insured is the sole client of 
defense counsel”). 
Texas 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Traver, 980 
S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tex. 1998) (stating insured is 
client; however, specifically stating that insurer 
may control defense and steps into the “shoes of the 
client” if there is no conflict of interest). 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
West Virginia 
State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 508 
S.E.2d 75, 88 (W. Va. 1998) (disagreeing with the 
majority view that attorney represents both the 
insurer and the insured; instead, the attorney 
represents the insured). 
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APPENDIX B: BAR ASSOCIATIONS’ ETHICS OPINIONS 
JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
United States 
of America 
American Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 01-421 (2001). 
Alabama 
Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. 
RO-98-02 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP 
File. 
Alaska Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 99-1 (1999), WESTLAW, AK Eth. Op. 99-1.  
Colorado 
Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 107 
(1999), http://www.cobar.org/comms/ethics/fo/ 
fo_107.htm (last visited June 22, 2001); Colo. Bar 
Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 91 (1993), 
http://www.cobar.org/comms/ethics/fo/fo_91.htm 
(last visited June 22, 2001). 
Connecticut Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 94-5 (1994), WESTLAW, CT. Eth. Op. 94-5. 
District of 
Columbia 
D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 290 (1999), 
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
Hawaii 
Haw. Sup. Ct. Disciplinary Bd., Formal Op. 36 
(1999), http://www.hsba.org/Hawaii/Admin/Disc/ 
36.htm (last visited June 22, 2001); Haw. Sup. Ct. 
Disciplinary Bd., Formal Op. 37 (1999), http://www. 
hsba.org/Hawaii/Admin/Disc/37.htm (last visited 
June 22, 2001). 
Idaho 
Idaho State Bar Ass’n Bd. of Comm’rs, Formal 
Ethics Op. 136 (1999) (on file with the Idaho State 
Bar). 
Illinois Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct 98-08 (1999), WESTLAW, IL Adv. Op. 98-08. 
Indiana 
Ind. State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 3 
(1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File; Ind. 
State Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 4 (1998), 
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Iowa Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 99-01 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
Kentucky Ky. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. E-404 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
Louisiana 
La. State Bar Ass’n Ethics Advisory Serv. Comm., 
unnumbered advisory opinion, reprinted in LSBA 
Ethics Advisory Service Committee Renders Non-
Binding Opinions, 45 LA. B.J. 438 (1998) (Question 
3), LEXIS, LEGNEW Library, LOUBAR File. 
Maine 
Me. Prof. Ethics Comm’n of the Bd. of Overseers of 
the Bar, Op. 164 (1998) (on file with the Me. Bar 
Ass’n), summarized in J. Scott Davis, Bd. of 
Overseers of the Bar, Bar Counsel’s 1998 Annual 
Report, 14 ME. B.J. 284, 290 (1999), LEXIS, 
LEGNEW Library, MEBARJ File. 
Maryland 
Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics 
Docket 99-7 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP 
File; Md. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics, Ethics 
Docket 00-23 (2000), LEXIS, Ethics Library, 
ETHOP File. 
Mississippi 
Miss. Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 246 (1999), LEXIS, 
Ethics Library, ETHOP File; Miss. Bar Ethics 
Comm., Op. 211 (1993), LEXIS, Ethics Library, 
ETHOP File. 
Missouri 
Mo. Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, 
Informal Advisory Op. 980,188 (1998), http://www. 
mobar.net/opinions/search.htm (last visited June 
22, 2001). 
Montana 
Mont. State Bar, Ethics Op. 900,517 (1990), 
http://www.montanabar.org/ethics/ethicsopinions/9
00517.html (last visited June 22, 2001). 
New York N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 716 (1999), WESTLAW, NY Eth. Op. 716. 
North Carolina N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Ethics Op. 10 (1998), WESTLAW, 1998 NC Eth. Op. 10. 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
Ohio 
Cincinnati Bar Ass’n Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility Comm., Ethics Inquiry 98-99-02 
(1998) (on file with the Cincinnati Bar Ass’n). 
Oregon Or. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 1999-157 (1999), WESTLAW, OR. Eth. Op. 1999-157. 
Pennsylvania 
Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 98-32 (1998), 
WESTLAW, PA Eth. Op. 98-32. 
Rhode Island 
R.I. Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-17 
(1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File; R.I. 
Sup. Ct. Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 99-18 (1999), 
LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
South Carolina S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 98-36 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
South Dakota 
S.D. State Bar, Ethics Op. 99-2 (1999), http://www. 
sdbar.org/members/ethics/1999/eo99-02.htm (last 
visited June 22, 2001). 
Tennessee 
Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Ethics Op. 99-F-143(a) (1999), WESTLAW, TN Eth. 
Op. 99-F-143(a); Tenn. Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Ethics Op. 99-F-143 (1999), 
WESTLAW, TN Eth. Op. 99-F-143. 
Utah Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 98-03 (1998), WESTLAW, UT Eth. Op. 98-03. 
Vermont 
Vt. Prof’l Responsibility Comm., Advisory Ethics 
Op. 98-7 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP 
File. 
Virginia Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1723 (1998), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
Washington 
Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195 (1999), 
http://www.wsba.org/c/RPC/fo/195.htm (last visited 
June 23, 2001). 
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JURISDICTION AUTHORITY 
West Virginia 
W. Va. State Bar Lawyer Disciplinary Bd., Legal 
Ethics Op. 99-02 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, 
ETHOP File. 
Wisconsin Wis. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. E-99-1 (1999), LEXIS, Ethics Library, ETHOP File. 
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APPENDIX C: COMPARING THE STATEMENT OF INSURED CLIENT’S RIGHTS 
WITH ETHICS OPINIONS AND THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISION 
THE STATEMENT OF INSURED 
CLIENT’S RIGHTS: 
MANY BAR ETHICS OPINIONS AND 
THE MONTANA DECISION: 
States that an attorney, at the 
outset of the representation, 
should determine if the attorney 
will be representing both the 
insured and the insurer. See 
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 
21. 
Analyze aspects of the 
relationship between the attorney 
and the insured as if the insured 
is the only client. See, e.g., In re 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct and 
Insurer Imposed Billing Rules 
and Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 814 
(Mont. 2000). 
States that under most policies, 
the insurer pays all fees and costs 
of defending the claim. See IPSSC 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 18. 
Prohibit an attorney from 
accepting compensation from the 
insurer under certain 
circumstances even if the insured 
agrees. See, e.g., In re Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct, 2 P.3d at 817. 
States that, under most policies, 
the insurance company will 
control the defense and the 
attorney will take instructions 
from the insurance company. See 
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 
18. 
Ignore this contractual 
relationship and the law 
approving the insurance contract. 
See, e.g., Ala. State Bar 
Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. 
RO-98-02 (1998). 
States the insured clients may 
communicate their preferences to 
the attorney. See IPSSC REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 18. 
Provide vague standards for 
determining when a guideline 
impairs an attorney’s professional 
judgment and thus effectively 
allow the attorney to both 
determine the governing 
standard and dictate how a case 
is to be conducted without regard 
to the insurer’s or insured clients’ 
preferences. See, e.g., Wis. State 
Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Ethics 
Op. E-99-1 (1999). 
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THE STATEMENT OF INSURED 
CLIENT’S RIGHTS: 
MANY BAR ETHICS OPINIONS AND 
THE MONTANA DECISION: 
States that the attorney, upon 
request by the insured, is to 
explain the guidelines to the 
insured or provide them with a 
copy of the guidelines; 
additionally states that the 
attorney must tell the insured if 
the attorney is denied 
authorization to provide a service 
or undertake an action the 
attorney believes necessary. See 
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 
18. 
Prohibit certain guidelines 
regardless of insured client 
agreement. See, e.g., Wash. State 
Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195 (1999). 
Informs the insured that the 
attorney may be required to 
withdraw from the representation 
if an actual conflict arises. See 
IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, at 
19. 
Presume a nonwaivable conflict 
in the presence of certain 
guidelines. See, e.g., Wash. State 
Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 195 (1999). 
Recognizes that the release of 
confidential information to a 
third-party auditor does not 
necessarily waive or jeopardize 
available privileges, and thus 
informs the insured that the 
attorney will advise the insured if 
the attorney believes a bill review 
or other action releases 
information in a manner that is 
contrary to the insured’s 
interests. See IPSSC REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 19. 
Presume that the release of 
confidential information is 
detrimental to the insured client 
and require that the insured 
must be contacted each time any 
information will be released. See, 
e.g., Utah State Bar Ethics 
Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 98-03 
(1998). 
Provides that the attorney is 
responsible for identifying 
conflicts of interest. See IPSSC 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 19. 
Presume a conflict of interest. 
See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of 
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 99-
01 (1999). 
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THE STATEMENT OF INSURED 
CLIENT’S RIGHTS: 
MANY BAR ETHICS OPINIONS AND 
THE MONTANA DECISION: 
Informs the insured of the 
possibility of an excess judgment. 
See IPSSC REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 19. 
Do not address the difference 
between settlements within 
policy limits and settlements 
exceeding policy limits. 
States that there is a potential for 
ethical conflicts any time another 
person or client is paying for the 
representation. See IPSSC 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 20. 
Presume an actual conflict and 
fail to recognize numerous other 
situations where one client pays 
for and controls the litigation. 
See, e.g., Idaho State Bar Ass’n 
Bd. of Comm’rs, Formal Ethics 
Op. 136 (1999). 
Acknowledges that it is 
impractical to require the 
attorney to obtain the insured 
client’s signature. See IPSSC 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. 
Require specific consent. See, e.g., 
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory 
Op. Comm., Op. 98-03 (1998). 
 
 
